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On January 14, 2021, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda won his sixth re-election
after thirty five years of control, marking the end to a severely contentious and violent
presidential campaign.1 Defined by civilian unrest, authoritative violence, and unprecedented
competition, this election calls into question both the current stability of Museveni’s regime, and
the puzzle of autocratic development in an increasingly modernized world. As autocratic states
continue to strengthen within a modern and economically developing world, it can no longer be
inferred that development alone leads to democratization; nor can it be expected that nations will
develop with democracy as an end goal. Modern case studies like Uganda suggest that
democratization can be made a means to an authoritarian end, subverting pre-existing ideas of
democracy and authoritarianism as antithetical to each other. The results of Uganda’s 2021
election offers important insights into the methods and practices of democratization in autocratic
regimes. A nation with a compex history of colonialism, military violence, and political
upheaval, Uganda’s political culture has been largely defined by structural developments
implemented by Museveni: a pattern of cultivating systems of institutional multiplicity through
the promise of democracy. But if democratization has been a key strategy of Museveni’s claim to
power, why would he risk such overtly authoritarian practices during the 2021 elections? In
addition, how has civil society continued to strengthen their mobilization in elections despite
Museveni’s systems of autocratic oppression, and the continued failure of electoral competition?
This paper seeks to understand Museveni’s regime strategy as a balancing act of
psuedemocratic institutions and discrete methods of institutional multiplicity that empower
autocratic state development. I argue that Museveni’s hybrid regime has utilized superficial
democratization as a means of manufacturing legitimacy. However, as evident in the fallout of
the 2021 elections, I believe there has been a significant shift in the balance of Museveni’s
practice of multiplicity and hybridization. Although political science has opted to analyse
Uganda through its institutional development, this shift is unlikely to be understood through
institutions and isolated actors alone. A complex understanding of civil society as a major
political actor under the conditions of autocracy is essential to understand the political future of
Museveni and his party, and the development of global autocracies.
Literature Review
I.
The Emergence of Hybrid Regimes
The “third wave of democratization” in the mid 1970s appeared to usher in a new era of
hope for supporters of democracy: roughly 85 authoritarian regimes came to an end, and about
30 of the regime changes ended in relatively stable democracies.2 However the proliferation of
hybrid political regimes across the globe following the Cold War combined “democratic rule
with authoritarian governance,” dramatically shifting political science concerning patterns of
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democratization and state development.3 Many African nations transitioned or developed in an
authoritarian direction, but this was juxtaposed with the emergence of democratic institutions
embedded in state-building initiatives. Recent scholarship has pivoted to focus on the emergence
of hybrid regimes, producing a large variety of labels for the different states, including
“competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), “semi-authoritarianism” (Goebel
2012), and “illiberalism” (Gilbert and Mohseni 2012).4
Since the 1990s, regional studies have analysed the emergence of hybrid governments as
the product of “traditional” governance with “modernized” institutions, explaining hybridization
as the combination of democratic and precolonial state institutions, or a “process of mutual
adaptation and transformation.”5 These definitions suggest hybridization as a product of
incomplete transition, a concept grounded in Western hegemony and modernization theory.
Although African regional literature parallels scholarship focused on the emergence of
competitive authoritarian states in nations such as Hungary, the examination of hybridity as the
process of “democratic backsliding” fails to consider the starkly different conditions of state
development within African nations. 6 First, Uganda has not experienced a “democratic
backsliding,” as it was never a democracy to begin with. Nations like Uganda transitioned from
hegemonic to competitive authoritarian rule, and there is little to suggest that its transition was
due to a substantive ideological shift of the regime.7 Gilbert and Payam Mohseni discuss the
emergence of hybrid regimes through the context of increasingly blurred “tensions and
boundaries” between democracies and authoritarianism.8 This suggests a transitional element to
hybridity, where the clash of democratic institutions and autocratic governance is suggestive of
either democratization or authoritarianism.9 Uganda has developed institutions to be purposefully
democratic and authoritarian, an intentional hybridity where the utilization of democratic
institutions by a non-democratic ruling body indicates a relationship between methods of
democratization and the survival of autocratic governance.
In addition, discourse has emerged in African comparative literature concerning the
vagueness of defining states as hybrid or psudeodemocratic, suggesting a focus on hybridization
is inadequate in conceptualizing the conditions of political development in post-colonial states.10
3

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism."
Journal of democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65.
4
Ottemoeller, Dan. “Popular Perceptions of Democracy: Elections and Attitudes in Uganda.” Comparative Political
Studies 31, no. 1 (February 1998): 98–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031001005.
5
Ottemoeller, Dan. “Popular Perceptions of Democracy: Elections and Attitudes in Uganda.” Comparative Political
Studies.
6
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism."
Journal of democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65.
7
Magaloni, Beatriz and Kricheli, Ruth, “Political Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of Political Science,
Vol. 13, pp. 123-143, 2010, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691289
8
Gilbert, L., Mohseni, P. “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes.” St Comp Int Dev
46, 270 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-011-9088-x
9
Gilbert, L., Mohseni, P. Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes. 28
10
Tom Goodfellow & Stefan Lindemann, “The Clash of Institutions: traditional authority, conflict and the failure of
‘hybridity’ in Buganda,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 51:1, 2013. 3-26.10.1080/14662043.2013.752175

8

Colonial incursion embedded severe legacies of violence, ethnic tension, and political disruption
that heavily marked the first few decades of independence, and created a political culture that
enabled autocratic leaders and authoritarian development.11 The development of Uganda's hybrid
regime was not a reaction to liberalism, but the product of an authoritarian agenda built from the
ruins of a military dictatorship.
II.

The Practice of Institutional Multiplicity
While hybridization informs our understanding of institutional autocracy, Scholars
Goodfellow and Lindemann argue that the term “institutional multiplicity” best describes the
development of the informal and formal powers essential to autocratic regime stability.12
Goodfellow et. al describes institutional multiplicity as the development of a “multiple rule
system” that engages with economic, political, and civil actors to provide “distinct and different
normative frameworks and incentive structures in which they act.”13 Unlike hybridity, which
implies the “direct mixing and melding of institutional arrangements into new and distinct
forms,” institutional multiplicity addresses the discreet political strategies of regime legitimacy
developed by autocracies.14 The practice of electoral corruption, systemic coercion, and civil
repression are acknowledged but frequently overlooked in scholarship analysing the conditions
of persuasion and co-optation that systematically restructured Uganda to aid Museveni’s
regime.15 Informal uses of state power, such as fear mongering and nationalist rhetoric, have
been essential to the sustainable legitimization of the hybrid autocratic institutions. A
comparative perspective on informal and formal methods of regime legitimization can synthesize
the theories of important scholars like Levitsky and Way and Gandhi and Przeworkski to best
dictate the importance of institutions in preserving autocratic regimes with the writings of
Goodfellow and Lindeman in understanding the “soft” powers dictated by institutional
mulitplicity.16
III.

The Missing Link: Civil Society
I agree with Goodfellow and Linderman that an institutional perspective is essential to
accurately understand the development of Uganda’s political system, and the conditions that
have empowered Museveni’s thirty-plus years of power. However, little of the regional and
political science scholarship have focused on the relationship of civil society and political
institutions within Uganda as relational in both directions; while Goodfellow et.al discuss the
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role of institutional multiplicity in manipulating social contracts, civil society itself is rarely
empowered as an independent political actor. While the development of civil society is almost
certainly shaped by the political structures of a nation, the recent instability of Museveni’s
regime legitimacy may be a product of a changing public that defies the conditions of the State’s
institutions. Uganda has experienced a significantly divided demographic of voters, the details of
which have been difficult to obtain.17 Data concerning the values and political participation of
Uganda’s civil society is incredibly limited, a shortcoming due to both logistics and the
government’s use of intimidation and oppression. Information on election results have been
tracked since their start in 1996, and statistics on regional demographics has been calculated both
by the Ugandan Census and international surveyors like the World Bank.18 However, much of the
data has focused solely on the economic development of the nation. An economic analysis of
Uganda proves to have little implication on the calculation of genuine democratization; despite
predictions by international groups on the democratic prospects for Uganda following the
promises and successes of Museveni, the nation remains intentionally hybridized. The global
focus of gross domestic product as a numeric representation of state development fails to
acknowledge the wealth of scholarship on hybrid regimes like competitive authoritarian states,
whose economic wealth only aids autocratic legitimacy.
Roberto Stefan Foa’s theory of the “modernization trap” may be a piece of the puzzle, as
he seeks to explain the forces that demand autocratic development and consolidation through the
lens of civil society.19 However, while the modernization trap focuses on political participation
and the “performance legitimacy” of an economically developing nation, the changing
demographics of Uganda shows a uniquely divided public. In addition, Museveni has not opted
for autocratic consolidation to appeal to the public, but a severely violent and abusive response
that seems to directly oppose decades of the strategic differentiation of his regime from the
violent dictatorships of his predecessors. Changes are clearly occurring within the political
culture and structures of the nation, but the cause and effect of such developments remain
unclear.
By bridging the scholarship on institutional multiplicity and regime hybridization in
Uganda’s development, I argue that Museveni has systematically manufactured legitimacy by
developing a hybrid regime that utilizes democratization as a means of preserving autocracy,
positioning democratic institutions as necessary to authoritarian survival in a modernizing world.
In addition, I seek to better understand the relationship between Museveni’s hybrid system of
institutional multiplicity and civil society, and the changing variables of autocratic legitimacy
through the case study of Uganda’s 2021 election.
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Background: Museveni’s Thirty Years of Regime Legitimacy
To properly understand Museveni’s intentional democratization as an authoritarian tool,
we must address the conditions of his rise to power, and the political variables that have since
enabled his presidency. Uganda did not gain independence from the United Kingdom until 1962,
and by then British colonial incursion had heavily restructured the political, cultural, and
economic composition of the territory.20 In the years that followed decolonization, Uganda bore
witness to a series of coups, military regimes, and unstable dictatorships as different authorities
sought to reorganize and reestablish a formidable state. Four main political actors shaped the
structure of power within Uganda: Milton Obote, Idi Amin, Tito Okello, and Yoweri Museveni. 21
A series of other leaders had power as well, but their regimes never enjoyed more than a year of
governance. A similarity between all four postcolonial political leaders is their ascendence to
authority through violent resistance. Obote and Amin both secured their power through coups
d'etat, Museveni through an armed insurgency.22 It is difficult to maintain stability after a violent
transition, as the new regime lacks legitimacy beyond its use of force. Obote and Amin both
failed to cultivate enough “hard” and “soft” powers to ease civil antagonism, forcing them to rely
on a monopoly of violence to remain in power.23 Obote and Amin positioned themselves as
violent dictators at odds with their citizens, ensuring their eventual ousting by opposition. Their
short stints of power were due to a failure to create a political settlement and supportive civil
society, and their alienation of social and ethnic groups left them vulnerable to any opposition.24
Upon seizing power in 1986, President Museveni and his National Resistance Movement
were careful to learn from the mistakes of predecessors. The aim of any autocratic state is to
preserve its power and dominance, but Museveni knew he had to be strategic to gain the
necessary support. A reliance on terror, intimidation, and military rule- as seen in the
dictatorships of Amin and Obote- increased internal vulnerability, encouraging fractionalization,
civil unrest, and the emergence of moral-hazard problems. In order to sustain his authority,
Museveni created a broad-based government that included leading figures from rival political
parties. He sought to end the ethnic divisions that had defined Uganda’s populace since
colonialism with a resurgence of nationalist rhetoric, and a revitalization of the economic powers
defined during colonialism to create a relationship between Uganda’s political and economic
bodies.25 He appealed to internal demands for democratization by implementing an election that
20
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would remain completely under the control of his regime. By organizing elections under a tight
authoritarian control, Museveni has established a balance between “electoral control and
electoral credibility,” situating his regime within a zone of structural ambivalence that allows for
governmental malleability.26 Back in 1986, when he had gained power through his armed
resistance movement, Museveni had sought to distinguish his rule from his predecessors by using
language of democratization to distill hope and support from Ugandans. As recorded by New
York Times journalist Sheila Rule during the first of his presidential speeches, Museveni
announced that “his first priorities would be the restoration of democracy and the protection of
the security of individuals and their property.”27 He promised the creation of improved national
elections, and while resting his hands on a Bible, declared democracy as ''the right of the people
of Africa,'' and that governments must not be ''the masters but the servers of the population.'' 28
For Museveni, democratization was a promise he could secure through the implementation of
institutions while remaining in complete control of state scope, allowing him to mitigate
opposition while superficially meeting the demands of civil society to sustain his leadership and
differentiate his governance from his predecessors.
A defining factor of competitive authoritarianism and hybrid regimes is the use of unfair
elections as a means of securing regime legitimacy and stability.29 Elections offer autocratic
regimes an opportunity to modernize their state building to reflect the needs and wants of their
populace- albeit superficially- through the cultivation of institutions.30 But while many nations
have experienced a democratic “backsliding” within the electoral institution, Uganda developed
into its hybrid regime after the fall of a brief military dictatorship headed by general Tito Okello.
Elements of elections existed, but held no legitimate authority. All leaders, including Museveni,
earned their position as head of state through armed resistance and/or violent upsurgence.31
Museveni’s move to create a functioning parliament and election was not an incorporation of one
structure to another as hybridization alone might suggest; it was the creation of “multiple rule
systems” that provided “distinct and different normative frameworks and incentive structures”
for the political elite and civil society.32
To implement both the “hard” and “soft” powers of institutional hybridization and
multiplicity, Museveni had to ensure that his process of democratization did not threaten his own
authoritarian leadership. Knowing that multiparty elections can disrupt the totality of a regime,
Museveni moved to create a single-party state, an increasingly common choice among
26
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authoritarian nations.33 Scholar Beatriz Magaloni argues that the intentional decision of leaders to
opt for the development of a party rather than a “personal-network strategy” allows the state to
broaden its control beyond individuals.34 For Museveni, the creation of a single party nation was
a tactical move to utilize democratic rhetoric within an authoritarian agenda while
simultaneously distinguishing himself from the military dictators of the past. Democratization
became a method of implementing authoritarian legitimacy within the institutional structure of
Uganda, changing the social and political norms of the nation to match Museveni’ agenda, and
secure both the formal and informal powers of his regime.
All of these decisions illuminate Museveni’s “double-pronged strategy for dealing with
his past and would-be-future opponents.”35 First, Museveni created institutions that would work
both to secure his authority and satisfy the interests of both Uganda’s civil society, and any
potential political opposition. Second, Museveni created a culture of multiplicity that allowed for
the normative desires of authority to co-opt his own institutions, and deploy the soft powers of
autocracy that are harder to notice. This interplay of formal and informal strategies for
authoritarianism utilized ideas of democratization to secure legitimacy on the ashes of the violent
dictatorships that had long defined Uganda.36 As Museveni’s regime continued to develop, the
role of hybrid institutions and multiplicity only heightened, as his intentional democratization of
institutions has paired with a reliance on patrimonialism and coercion that inform our
understanding of Uganda’s political culture prior to the 2021 election.
A Shift in Power and Museveni’s Autocratic Reaction
Despite Museveni’s institutional cultivation of legitimacy, the results of the 2021
elections demonstrate a significant shift in the landscape of Ugandan contentious politics and
civil society, suggesting that change is underfoot within the political structure of the nation. For
the first time since establishing elections and securing his presidency, Museveni lost his
stronghold on Central Uganda (historically known as Buganda), the most populous region within
Uganda, and the hub of the nation’s political, economic, and cultural forces.37 He also lost
Busoga, a city that acts as the economic center of Eastern Uganda. Both regions voted in favor of
the National Unity Platform’s (NUP).38 After Buganda had been established as the economic
powerhouse of the nation by British imperialists in the Buganda Agreement, the nation has
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directed the “largest share of capital and labor intensive projects to these regions.”39 Their failure
to comply suggests underlying opposition to the regime that goes beyond the grasp of
Museveni’s institutions. This unprecedented opposition to the authority of the National
Resistance Movement resulted in a loss of seats within both parliament and local government
elections: 25 of the 30 cabinet ministers losing their parliamentary seats were NRM.40 These
numbers may still increase, as petitions concerning the election may resolve in the NUP’s favor.
The National Unity Platform appears to be gaining traction in Uganda. Although it was
only just formed in 2020, it has been emboldened by its origins in the People Power Movement.
One of the youngest countries, the majority of Uganda’s population are under the age of 35, with
8 million citizens between the ages of 18 and 30.41 Within this demographic, unemployment has
skyrocketed to 70%.42 The People Power Movement in Uganda has drawn on the urgency of the
economic crisis and appealed to the younger voters who are less easily swayed by Museveni’s
reliance on rhetoric of historical legitimacy, and his actions of the past. Museveni’s controlled
democratization may have secured the implementation of his hybrid regime, but he is losing his
grip on the softer powers of governance, particularly over his younger populace. The longevity
of Museveni’s regime has cultivated a growing sense of discontent from the younger generation,
many of whom have never lived with another president, and are unfazed by the superficial
democratic opportunities Museveni has presented.43
Arguably the most contentious part of the 2021 election was the presidential vote itself.
Museveni’s main opponent was popular musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi
Ssentamu, known as Bobi Wine. Wine, age thirty-nine, caught the attention of Uganda’s young
population, inspired by his populist rhetoric. His campaign quickly became a symbol of national
resistance, embodying a powerful message of change and mobilization.44 Museveni’s response to
such a strong opposition was one of violence and intimidation. Forced detention, torture, and
severe censorship were just some of the method’s utilized by Museveni and his military and
security forces.45 Museveni ultimately won the 2021 presidential election (a result Wine quickly
rejected as fraudulent), but Bobi Wine’s success in mobilizing the public suggests an important
shift in the political order of Uganda, and the role of competition in Museveni’s performative
elections.46
Museveni’s brash authoritarian response leading up to the 2021 elections juxtaposed
decades of strategic democratic development and his pretense of national unity. His institutions
remained intact; even with the loss of parliamentary seats, the NRM maintained its majority, and
Museveni secured another presidential term. But his actions to reduce competition were
39
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reminiscent of the very dictators he sought to distinguish himself from, relying on censorship,
violence, and intimidation to secure success.
Just one day before the Ugandan presidential vote, Museveni ordered a total internet shut
down throughout Uganda, claiming it a necessary step to prevent fraud.47 This move was highly
suspicious, and national and international organizations were quick to doubt the accuracy of the
34,344 polling stations.48 The Electoral Committee then decided to abandon its use of the polling
equipment entirely, resulting in a manual count.49 Since January, the EC has still failed to release
the Declaration of Results from the different stations, as required by law, and has instead released
results by region. The chairman of the EC, Simon Byakakama, has defended this move by
resulting to nationalistic rhetoric, saying, “A presidential election has only one constituency, the
whole country.”50 Nationalism as a pardon to autocracy has significant precedent; Museveni’s
decision to create a single-party election was grounded in an argument for national unity post
decades of colonial incursion and political strife. But while it may have worked in the
implementation of the institutions, it has lost its sway among the public today.
In addition to attacking the electoral institution and participation of the public, Museveni
directly targeted Bobi Wine. During the ten weeks of the formal presidential campaign, state
enforcement, known as the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UDPF), prevented all political
rallies and gatherings in support of Wine.51 Museveni cited the Coronavirus pandemic as
justification for disbanding public events, a rule he did not adhere to in his own campaign. The
UDPF also repeatedly arrested and assaulted Wine, resulting in the death of at least one
bodyguard, and multiple injuries among his campaign team. Violence then turned towards the
public: in the worst instance, security forces fired their guns on dozens of civilians actively
protesting Museveni’s attacks on Wine. At least fifty-four people were killed, and more than 600
arrested.52 Journalists were also victimized by Museveni’s military and security forces. At least
ten journalists were reported to be hospitalized after attacks throughout the campaign, and those
left were subject to decertification from Museveni’s Media Council, who required a federal
registration prior to any coverage of the election.53
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The violence and censorship that characterized this election suggests a significant
disconnect in the intention and functionality of Museveni’s electoral institutions and the
institutional multiplicity that has long defined his regime. Similar coercive strategies were
witnessed in the elections of 2011 and 2006, with the harsh handling of civilian unrest
significantly reducing voter turnout. But the 2011 election revealed hints of a regime hesitant to
rely on prior tactics of intimidation to dispel populist appeals, focusing instead on the coercive
powers of the state, including bribery and patrimonialism.54 Museveni knew that electoral fraud
and violence would result in significant dividends, potentially harming his future prospects in
maintaining his governance. In an attempt for moderation, Museveni reduced his restrictions
concerning opposition in 2011 and 2016, allowing the other candidates to campaign more freely
and citizens to rally publicly.55 His strategic tolerance seemed to work: Ugandans seemed less
inclined to participate, and without as much attention being drawn by the State’s abuses of
power, the presidential election resulted in an unsurprising victory for Museveni.
So what has changed? Why would Museveni opt for such authoritarian tactics in the
election of 2021 despite his reliance on psuedemoctatic principles, nationalistic rhetoric, and
strategic uses of the hard and soft powers of his regime?
Scholarship concerning the governmental development of Uganda has argued that
Museveni’s regime can be understood as a “continual process of recalibration and of balancing
out across these strategic modes,” whereby consistent negotiations of power must be held
between the “public and the private, the formal and the informal, the illegal and the legal.”56 The
shifts in political response to elections can be understood on face value by the ideas of
institutional multiplicity, where hybridization is secured by the development of different yet
collaborative institutional strategies and practices.57 Museveni’s reliance on violence and
intimidation to secure his presidency and the significant losses within the NRM party suggests
that the “balancing” act of pseudo-democratization and institutional multiplicity is failing to
produce the necessary legitimacy. Nothing significant changed in the structure of the elections
itself, and Museveni’s process of democratic development and deconsolidation occurred prior.
What the 2021 election demonstrated was a shift in the fundamental political order of civil
society within Uganda. Civil society within Uganda is a major political actor often discussed as
subject to institutional hybridization and multiplicity, and less so a catalyst for institutional
change. The 2021 election, which involved the success of a pop star candidate and significant
civil mobilization, illuminated significant gaps in the norms perpetuated by the formal and
informal practices of multiplicity, and a regime that remains limited to the demands of an
increasingly modernizing public.

54

Izama, Angelo. 2011. "UGANDA: MUSEVENI'S TRIUMPH AND WEAKNESS." Journal of Democracy 22 (3):
64-78. doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.ups.edu/10.1353/jod.2011.0044.
55
Izama, Angelo. 2011. "UGANDA: MUSEVENI'S TRIUMPH AND WEAKNESS." Journal of Democracy.
56
Tom Goodfellow & Stefan Lindemann, “The Clash of Institutions: traditional authority, conflict and the failure of
‘hybridity’ in Buganda,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 51:1, 2013. 3-26.10.1080/14662043.2013.752175
57
Goodfellow & Stefan Lindemann, “The Clash of Institutions: traditional authority, conflict and the failure of
‘hybridity’ in Buganda.”

16

To combat and mitigate the power of the public, autocratic regimes develop institutions to
redistribute political plurality, participation, and opposition. Museveni’s single-party elections
developed- both progressively and then regressively- with this intention. These events often took
place under the guise of democratization and national unity, rhetoric that was readily accepted by
a public bearing the legacies of political upheaval. The regime’s softer powers, embodied by the
practice of institutional multiplicity, rely on manipulation and coercion to control the conditions
of democratization.58 But since these soft powers are illegitimate by nature, a shift in their
balance is a significant threat to the regime.
The lack of information concerning public values at first suggests a successful autocratic
attempt to reduce the strength and presence of political plurality and public participation. The
public reaction in the 2021 elections, however, suggests otherwise.
One common explanation for changes in an authoritarian regime’s control of the public is
grounded in Roberto Stefan Foa’s theory of the “modernization trap.”59 As middle-income
authoritarian nations continue to develop, administrative and institutional practices seek to
engage with an increasingly liberal economic framework, both to increase the success of the
state, and meet the demands of the public they seek to control. As autocratic states modernize,
“performance legitimacy” becomes a larger measurement of regime capacity: this juxtaposes the
autonomy demanded by an autocracy. Foa’s “modernization trap” discusses the rising demands
of a populace that naturally arises from a successful state, as citizens demand more political
participation, transparency, and bureaucratic efficiency from a stronger state.60 This trap helps
explain the civil upheaval as witnessed in the Arab Gulf and throughout Asia, as well as Brazil,
Taiwan, and Spain, all of which have been forced to contend with increasing pressure to create a
multiparty government.61 If Uganda is to follow a similar path towards political liberalization- a
demand embodied by the campaign success of Bobi Wine and removal of NRM party leadersthe rising state capacity of the nation may inform a discussion on why Museveni’s hybrid system
of institutional multiplicity is losing its grip on its populace. Museveni grounded his first decade
of power in the promise of revolution, and Uganda’s economic progress helped ensure his
performance legitimacy. The nation’s post-1986 economic improvement led to a rapidly
expansive education system and a higher demand for well-paying jobs, of which there are few.62
As one of the youngest-aged nations in the world, Uganda’s educated youth have statistically
increased their political engagement, and candidates like Bobi Wine appeal to their desire for a
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post-Museveni era.63 In addition, an increase in travel and the utilization of media has broken
down logistical barriers that have isolated Ugandan citizens, encouraging municipalities, and
expanding anti-Museveni campaigns to the most rural parts of the state.64
Bobi Wine capitalized off of this changing demographic of voters. In one of his earliest
campaign speeches, Wine publicly accused Museveni of crimes including corruption and
dictatorship, and appealed to Uganda’s individual ethnic groups by citing the ways that Museveni
has actively betrayed identity groups.65 His rhetoric weaponized Museveni’s reliance on
nationalistic rhetoric in legitimizing the development and consolidation of state institituons.
However: Museveni and his National Resistance Movement remain popular across the
nation, particularly among older, rural voters whose experience of regime change has been
severely haunted by Uganda’s violent history.66 The relationship between political change and
chaos has encouraged voters to continue to vote in favor of Museveni, citing his economic
success and relative period of peace as reasons for their support. Performance legitimacy remains
a significant factor of civilian support.
Uganda’s modernization trap, which has been exacerbated by the education and
generation gap, is becoming increasingly salient. The overtly autocratic tactics used by Museveni
to disrupt Bobi Wine’s campaign suggests that he is all too aware of the increasing threat of his
populace to his regime’s legitimacy. The older demographics may rate Museveni’s performance
legitimacy as relatively successful, but younger voters are far more critical of Uganda’s
hybridity, and aware of his tactics of pseudo democracy.67 Museveni’s reliance on superficial
democratization is no longer securing his legitimacy in an increasingly modernized state.
Another unpredictable challenge to Museveni’s system of legitimacy can be explained
through the rise of social media in mobilizing civil society. The internet has become an
increasingly powerful force in promoting information, communication, and dissent among
politicians, citizens, companies, and bureaucrats, facilitating its own social contracts between
citizens and the state.68 While a government can use social media to influence and co-opt public
conceptions of their policies and actions, citizens can use social media both as a means of
expressing collective dissent that would be otherwise too risky in an autocratic state. Museveni’s
hybrid regime does not completely restrict mobilization; his utilization of institutional
multiplicity ensures state control over the conditions of civil engagement, making dissent
possible, but ineffective. However, unlike the traditional internet, modern social media offers a
less regulated space that may have a democratising impact on society that surpasses the
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government’s scope. In Uganda, social media users are mostly urban elite, students, youth, civil
actors, and politicians, suggesting a correlation between the use of social media for news and
communication and the demographic of active voters.69
In line with its psuedodemoratic hybridity, Uganda has enacted its national constitution in
accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and international law that
protects freedom of expression, which the courts have expanded to include free speech via
technology.70 Yet this is not the reality. Domestic laws on electronic communication have
disproportionately limited citizens, activists, and politicians who critique the president and his
party. In 2013, Museveni’ security minister Muruli Musaka created the social media monitoring
centre, with the aim of “weed[ing] out those who use it to damage the government and people’s
reputations.”71 In 2018, the centre introduced a social media tax to “raise resources to cope with
the consequences” of “gossip.”72 Uganda’s Computer Misuse Act has repeatedly pressed charges
of harassment against online activists, and Museveni’s Anti-Terrorism Act further limited online
content that suggested governmental opposition.73
These laws and policies legalized Museveni’s internet shutdowns prior to the 2021
elections, a decision that confirms the media's potential to destabilize the existing regime.
Museveni declared the shut down necessary to avoid outside interference, and national bans on
social media platforms (which authorities claimed to be unbiased) extended beyond January.74
Bobi Wine, who was placed under unofficial house arrest during and after the election, cited the
shut down as evidence of a fraudulent election, refusing to accept the results of Museveni’s
extended presidency.
Although the rise of social media as a new platform for civil engagement may suggest
democratization, a modernized autocracy has the potential to develop sophisticated censorship
tools to utilize social media for their own benefit, disrupting civil mobilization and reducing
information that could delegitimize the nation.75 Uganda has surveillance ability, but the nation’s
agenda appears focused on censorship, not state manipulation. For a regime dependent on
institutional multiplicity, it has struggled to co-opt social media. The contentious relationship
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between social media and its potential for strengthening or weakening autocracy remains
unknown, but if Uganda remains reactionary rather than progressive in its agenda, it may be at
risk of losing significant power over its populace.
In Conclusion
Scholarship and literature concerning the rise of hybrid regimes, transitional governance
within Africa, and the development of Uganda has focused significantly on institutions and
“strong-man” governance. Uganda’s current political model can be best understood through its
use of hybrid institutions and institutional multiplicity, where democratization is not an end goal
for a transitional state, but an intentional tool of legitimacy for the existing autocratic regime.
However, Museveni’s reliance on overtly autocratic principles in response to the contentious
2021 governmental election suggests an imbalance in the effectiveness and sustainability of the
hybrid institutions and their practice of institutional multiplicity. Reasons for this shift are not yet
clear, and the repercussions remain unknown. A major piece of the puzzle may rest in civil
society itself, a major political actor that is not adequately empowered in political scholarship
and regional studies, particularly in regards to Uganda. While the institutional structures and
practices of the state are essential to understand current events, a changing public will have
severe implications on the political future of Museveni and his National Resistance Movement.
Civil engagement with an increasingly modernized world has changed the variables of
performance legitimacy, encouraged civil unrest, and expanded reliance on modern technology
and social media. These changes severely undermine the capacity of Museveni’s regime, which
remains dependent on its ability to control the conditions of democratization and manufacture
legitimacy to best suit his agenda. Institutions of multiplicity are only effective as far as they are
embodied and interpreted. Political scholarship must develop to adequately address civil society
not as dependent on institutional multiplicity and regime development, but as a political actor
itself. Yoweri Museveni maintained his governance this January, but as civil society continues to
demand change, future elections will only become more controversial. Understanding the
relationship between hybrid regimes, legitimacy, and the role of civil society is vital to
developing accurate and adaptable political science, and the development of global civil unrest.
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